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Drafting Enforceable Non-solicitation
Agreements in Kentucky
Elizabeth E. Nicholas'
I. INTRODUCTION
"James Pilger, the owner of a luxury hair salon in Plainview, NY, never
saw it coming. In the space of three months, the cream of his staff jumped
to a new salon started by a trusted employee of 17 years."' With his best
employees now working for a competitor, Mr. Pilger was forced to close his
business and take a job at a nearby salon.3 Because of his employees' dis-
loyalty, Mr. Pilger became aware that a non-solicitation clause is an impor-
tant tool for an employer in preventing an ex-employee from damaging the
employer's business interests. Mr. Pilger's loss exemplifies why Kentucky
employers should require key employees to sign non-solicitation agree-
ments. Such agreements prohibit individuals from recruiting others to a
competitor's business using information obtained from, and to the detri-
ment of, their former place of employment.4
A "non-solicitation" agreement in an employment contract "seeks to
prohibit employees from soliciting their co-workers for a period of specified
years after the employee leaves his or her former employment.. 5 "Without
a non-solicitation covenant or the broader and often accompanying non-
compete covenant, an employee is free to leave employment.., recruit
and hire away employees, and compete with a former employer so long as
no confidential information is used."6 Thus, requiring key employees to
sign non-solicitation agreements and knowing how Kentucky courts will
I J.D. expected 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law; M.B.A. 2003, University
of Kentucky; B.B.A. 200 1, University of Kentucky. The author would like to thank her family
for their constant love and support.
2 David Koeppel, Lose the Employee, Keep the Business, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1990, at C5 (Mr.
Pilger stated, "Twenty five of my key people took 44 of my top 50 paying clients .... I went
from $50,000 a week to $25,ooo a week.").
3 Id.
4 See LEE R. PETILLON & ROBERT JOE HULL, REPRESENTING START-UP COMPANIES § 9:46
(2005).
5 STEVEN C. KAHN & BARBARA BERISH BROWN, LEGAL GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCES § 8:21
(2oo6).
6 Thomas D. Rees, Non-solicitation Clauses in Employment Agreements, 2005 PA. BAR INST.,
ELEVENTH ANNUAL EMP. L. INST., http://www.hsrs-law.com/pbizoo5.asp.
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enforce these agreements may be crucial to protecting an employer's busi-
ness interests.
The purpose of this Note is to provide Kentucky practitioners with an
overview of the factors courts frequently use to determine whether non-
solicitation agreements are enforceable. While non-solicitation agreements
offer protections to employers, because of the burdens they impose on ex-
employees, courts nonetheless may be reluctant to enforce them.7 "As a
result, if an employer fails to take proper care in drafting these agreements,
they may not'be worth the paper on which they are written."8 For this rea-
son, this Note will analyze why certain jurisdictions uphold non-solicitation
agreements and the motivations behind their decisions. Then, based on
these lines of reasoning, this Note will attempt to predict how Kentucky
courts will analyze non-solicitation agreements and will suggest steps prac-
titioners should take to maximize the effectiveness of these covenants. Part
II of this Note provides general background information on non-solicita-
tion agreements and provides examples of the consequences that may oc-
cur when an employer brings an action against a party that induces his or
her employees to leave employment.9 Part III explains the approach Ken-
tucky courts take in determining the validity of restrictive employment
covenants.'0 Then, in an attempt to provide guidance to drafters of these
agreements, Part IV analyzes the various approaches taken by five differ-
ent jurisdictions." Part V compares the various approaches and provides
useful guidance to the Kentucky practioner on how to draft enforceable
non-solicitation agreements.' Part VI concludes that without an enforce-
able mechanism with which to protect an employer's interests, pirating and
raiding by former employees may be detrimental to one's business.'
3
II. WHAT IS AN EMPLOYEE NoN-SOLICITATION AGREEMENT?
A. General Rules Regarding Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants
The enforceability of restrictive covenants is a fact-specific determina-
tion.' 4 Some jurisdictions disfavor restrictive covenants because they inter-
7 Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation Agrrents: An Overview and Steps for Employers to
Take to Maximize Their Effectiveness, LEGAL UPDATE (Funkhouser, Vegosen, Liebman & Dunn
Ltd., Chicago, IL1.), Nov. 2oo5, http://www.fvldlaw.com/newsletters/2oo5-1 i.htm [hereinafter
Funkhouser].
8 Id.
9 See infra notes 14-51 and accompanying text.
io See infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
i i See infra notes 74-116 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 117-65 and accompanying text.
13 See infra Part VI.
14 Funkhouser, supra note 7.
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fere with an individual's ability to earn a living, conflict with the notion of
a free economy, and provide undue protection to the employer who estab-
lishes his operation in the area first."5 Nevertheless, restrictive covenants
are generally enforceable where they are reasonable, meet contractual
prerequisites, and, if regulated by statute, comply with statutory require-
ments. 6 For instance, covenants not to compete, being a partial restraint
of trade, are not always favored in the law, but such covenants have a bet-
ter chance of enforcement "if they are reasonably necessary to protect an
employer's legitimate business interests, without imposing undue hardship
on the employee or adversely affecting the public interest."' 7 On the other
hand, if the true purpose of the anticompetitive covenant is to prevent the
employee from leaving rather than protecting the business, the covenant is
unenforceable. 8
Generally, the reasonableness of an anticompetitive covenant is deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis, "and the courts, in determining whether un-
reasonable restrictions may be modified, usually take into account various
factors, such as the territorial scope and duration of the restraints, as well
as the activities that are prohibited."' 9 Although an unreasonable covenant
against competition is not enforceable, modification of the duration and ter-
ritorial scope of the unenforceable restriction enhances enforcement."0 As
mentioned, partial enforcement of unreasonable restrictions still requires
the resulting restriction to be consistent with public policy, not injurious to
the public interest, not unduly harsh to the employee, and only operate to
such extent as is reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the em-
ployer."'
B. Non-solicitation Agreement versus a Non-compete Agreement
There are several types of contractual restraints, as well as prophylactic
measures, an employer could put into place before an employee announc-
es that he or she is departing.2 For example, if Mr. Pilger had "asked his
employees to sign written commitments to refrain from competing against
15 Arnold H. Pedowitz, A Practical and Ethical Discussion on Advising Clients Confronting
Non-competition, Non-solicitation, and Loyaly Issues, in 6o PRACTISING L. INST., LITIGATION &
ADMINISTRATION PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 328-29 (999).
16 54A AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 888 (2oo6).
17 Id.
18 Id.
i9 Ferdinand S. TinioAnnotation, Enforceabifily, Insofaras Restrictions WouldBe Reasonable,
of Contract Containing Unreasonable Restrictions on Competition, 61 A.L.R.3D 397, 404 (2005).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See Koeppel, supra note 2.
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him or otherwise undermining his franchise," he may still be in business. 3
These contractual protections fall into two broad categories: non-com-
pete and non-solicitation agreements. "Non-compete agreements bar em-
ployees from competing directly with their former [employers, while] non-
solicitation agreements prohibit employees from recruiting employees or
clients of the business they left."2 4 A traditional non-compete agreement
generally states that, upon the termination of employment from that busi-
ness, the employee will not engage in specific activities competitive with
the former employer's business for a specified time period within a speci-
fied geographic area." Unlike non-compete agreements, non-solicitation
agreements do not restrict a former employee from working for a competi-
tor. Rather, they typically prohibit solicitation of customers, employees,
or both. 6 A customer non-solicitation agreement "prohibits terminated
employees from soliciting business from the customers and prospective
customers of his or her former employer," which protects the employer's
interest in developing customer relationships and contacts.2 7 Restrictions
on a former employee from recruiting his co-workers after he leaves his
employment is the second type of non-solicitation covenant," which pri-
marily protects the employer's interests in maintaining a stable workforce.
Because non-solicitation agreements do not prevent the former em-
ployee from competing altogether, but merely require him or her to hire
employees in some other manner or from some other source, courts con-
sider non-solicitation agreements less anticompetitive than non-compete
covenants.2 9 Courts also may give non-solicitation agreements more defer-
ence because they are more narrowly tailored to an employer's legitimate
business interests.30 However, because non-solicitation agreements place
some limitation upon the competitive freedom of employees, such a pro-
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Funkhouser, supra note 7.
26 Benton J. Mathis, Jr. & Bradley T Adler, Never Say Goodbye: Enforcing Non-compete
Agreements and Protecting Confidential Information, PUBLICATIONS (Freeman, Mathis, & Gary,
LLP), http://www.fmglaw.com/Publications49.html (last visited Sept. 9, zoo6).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 2 Louis ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES §
16:44 (4th ed. 2006) (citing Smith, Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Robinson, 12 E3d 515 (5th
Cir. 1994) (noting that the former employee is free to recruit employees on behalf of his new
employer anywhere, any time, and from any organization, save only that small class compris-
ing the former employer's employees); Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 843 (Ct. App.
1985) ("This does not appear to be any more of a significant restraint on his engaging in his
profession, trade or business than a restraint on solicitation of customers or on disclosure of
confidential information.")).
30 Susan P.SerotaRestrictiveCovenantsinExecutiveEmploymentContracts&,in53 PRACTISING
L. INST., TAX LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 413, 427 (2001).
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vision may be subject to some of the same restrictions as those placed on
non-compete covenants.3
C. Why Should an Employer Require a Key Employee
To Sign a Non-solicitation Agreement?
If an employee solicits co-employees to join him or her in a competing
enterprise prior to termination, the employee has breached his duty of
loyalty to the employer.3" However, this result changes upon termination.
Once the employment relationship ends, if no non-solicitation agreement
exists, departing employees may freely "solicit employees of their former
employer to come to work for a competitor, so long as unfair or deceptive
means are not used."33 However, many jurisdictions will uphold provisions
that prohibit a former employee from soliciting former co-workers when
that employee has entered into an employee non-solicitation covenant. 34
Most employers who utilize a restrictive covenant in an employment
agreement do so to prevent the unexpected resignation of a key execu-
tive or salesperson who could use client relationships or business expertise
gained at the employer's expense to form a competing entity.35 As men-
tioned, non-solicitation agreements can prevent former employees from
competing against their former employers by barring the employees from
luring co-workers to a competing business. 36 Fortunately for employers,
these "non-solicitation covenants have been met with relatively little ju-
dicial resistance, as courts have held that it is reasonable for an employer
31 Cf. id. at 417 (explaning that non-competition clauses have been subjected to strict
scrutiny because of their limitation on competitive freedom).
32 2 ALTMAN, supra note 29.
33 Compare Larry C. Drapkin & Samantha C. Grant, Strategies for Dealing with Departing
Employees: Why Wait Until Then?Lets Think About it Now, in 1233 PRACTISING L. INST., CORPORATE
LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 261, 269 (zooi), with Bancroft-Whitney Co. v.
Glen, 411 P.zd 921, 936 (Cal. 1966) (explaining that during employment, an employee has a
duty of loyalty to his or her employer which prohibits him or her from soliciting co-workers
to leave their employment to work for a competitor: the court held that management-level
employees may not take steps to set up a competing business, while still employed, where
their actions are harmful to their employer).
34 See Drapkin & Grant, supra note 33; cf Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic
Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. zd 573, 576-77 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that "competitors may solicit
another's employees if they do not use unlawful means or engage in acts of unfair competi-
tion"); Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41 (holding that the non-solicitation contract was not void
on its face under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § i66oo).
35 Kenneth J. Vanko, "You're Fired! And Don't Forget Your Non-Compete. : The
Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, ! DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J.
1, 1 (2002).
36 Eric D. Hone, Should You Have Non-compete Agreements?, NEv. EMP. L. LETrER, May
2004, Westlaw 9 No. 8 SMNVEMPLL2
2oo6-2oo7]
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to protect its investment in training its staff and maintaining a competent
workforce."37
Employers should consider having a non-solicitation agreement with
any employee who could significantly disadvantage the company in the
marketplace if they went to work for a competitor.38 Employees who sign
non-solicitation agreements often become subject to litigation when they
engage in recruiting employees who currently work for their former em-
ployer.3 9 Even though litigation over employment agreements can be ex-
pensive, these agreements provide enormous value in their ability to deter
employees from engaging in employee solicitation. 40
D. Breach of a Non-solicitation Agreement
If the stakes are high enough, the former employee and his or her new em-
ployer could face enormous liability. For instance, when Black & Decker
hired David P. Olsen, a former employee of Image Dynamics, the public
relations firm claimed that Black & Decker violated their non-solicitation
agreement by seeking to raid its employees and force it out of business. 4'
Upholding the non-solicitation agreement, a Maryland jury awarded Image
Dynamics $940,000 ($645,000 against Black & Decker and $295,000 against
Olsen).42 For similar reasons, Prudential Securities sued some of its top
executives and the firm they joined for violations of the executives' non-
solicitation agreements. 43 When the unit head of Prudential's asset-backed
securities group and eight other executives, who together accounted for
more than ninety percent of the revenue generated by the asset-backed
securities group, resigned and joined Credit Suisse First Boston ("CSFB"),
Prudential brought suit against the former executives and CSFB to enforce
the employees' non-solicitation agreements. Prudential won a temporary
37 Vanko, supra note 35, at 7.
38 See Hone, supra note 36 ("Noncompetition agreements should be used only for em-
ployees who could truly hurt your company if they began to work for- or become- the compe-
tition .... The key is that the restrictions must be reasonably tailored to protect [the employ-
er's] legitimate business interests. Therefore, the restrictions place on a sales agent almost
certainly will be different from those on a director of research and development.").
39 David D. Powell, Jr., Non-solicitation Agreements: How Enforceable Are They?, COLO.
EMP. L. LETTER, Mar. 2001, Westlaw io No.3 SMCOEMPLLi.
40 Hone, supra note 36.
41 Kristine Henry, Black & Decker to Pay Brotman $235,ooo-Court of Appeals Declines to
Take Up LongLegal Battle, BALTIMORE SUN (Baltimore, Md.), Feb. 15, 2002 at I IC.
42 Id. The Maryland intermediate appeals court ruled that Black & Decker had inten-
tionally interfered with a non-compete clause when it retained Olsen's newly formed com-
pany after pulling its account from Image Dynamics. Id.
43 Prudential Wins Court Bidto Bar Hifings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2ooo, at C14.
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court order that prevented CFSB from hiring more employees and sought
monetary damages from CFSB and the individuals.'
When an ex-employee bound by a non-solicitation agreement induc-
es a current employee to resign, the employer has a number of potential
claims.45 While a breach of contract claim against an employee who par-
ticipated in the recruitment may be impractical due to his or her limited
financial resources,' almost all other causes of action rely on, or are en-
hanced by, the existence of a non-solicitation agreement in the employee's
contract. Employers often bring actions against the new employer under
a theory of tortious interference with contractual or business relations.47
Courts may also label this as an action for inducement of breach of con-
tract, interference with contract, interference with advantageous relations,
unfair competition," or an action for employee piracy or raiding.49 On the
other hand, if an ex-employee recruited co-workers for a competitor, the
employer may bring an action against the ex-employee for breach of a re-
strictive covenant" or under a breach of fiduciary duty theory if the former
employee acted against the employer's interest while still employed.51
III. How KENTUCKY COURTS INTERPRET NON-SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS
Kentucky does not regulate restrictive covenants in employment contracts
by statute, thus employers must rely on the courts' interpretation of restric-
tive covenants. While Kentucky courts have not specifically addressed the
44 Id.
45 See James J. O'Mailey, Cause of Action by Employer against Party Inducing Employee
to Leave Employment, in 19 CAUSES OF AcTION 745 (2oo5); see, e.g., Frederick Chusid & Co.
v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 326 F. Supp. io43 (S.D.N.Y 1971) (breach of fiduciary duty);
Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.zd 921 (Cal. 1966) (wrongful inducement claim against
competing employer who recruits employees from the plaintiff); Ryan, Elliott & Co. v. Leggat,
McCall & Werner, Inc., 396 N.E.zd ioo9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (breach of contract).
46 See Carolina Overall Corp. v. E. Carolina Linen Supply, Inc., 174 S.E.2d 659, 661 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1970).
47 The basic elements of a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship are:
(i) The existence of a valid business relation, (z) Knowledge of the relationship on the part of
the interferer, (3) Intentional and unjustified act of interference on the part of the interferer,
(4) Proof that the interference caused the harm sustained, (5) Damage to the party whose
relationship has been disrupted. 45 Am. JUR. 2D Interference § 48 (2005).
48 See Diodes Inc. v. Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 25 (Ct. App. 1968).
49 SeeAvtec Indus., Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 5oo A.zd 712 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1985) (em-
ployee piracy); Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 191 S.E.zd 761 (S.C. 1972) (employee raid-
ing).
50 See Ryan, Elliott & Co., 396 N.E.2d 1oo9 (involving intentional interference claim
against person who hired away two employees who had employment contracts for fixed pe-
riods of time).
51 See Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 326 F. Supp 1043 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
2oo6-2oo7]
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enforceability of covenants prohibiting the solicitation of employees, sev-
eral cases have addressed the enforceability of customer non-solicitation
clauses."s By analogy, these and other cases that apply the general rules of
restrictive covenants provide insight as to how Kentucky courts may rule
on a violation of an employee non-solicitation agreement.
In general, Kentucky courts hold that contracts in restraint of competi-
tion are enforceable if the contracts are (1) reasonable and (2) limited as
to territory or duration. 3 A contract restraining competition is reasonable
if the restraint is narrow enough to provide protection of the legitimate in-
terests of the party seeking protection and not so broad as to interfere with
public interests- 4 Whereas contracts in restraint of trade are not enforce-
able where they are unlimited as to both time and space-or just unlimited
as to space-they are enforceable where they are unlimited as to time but
are confined to a reasonable territory.55
In Wells v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., several stockbrokers
alleged that customer non-solicitation provisions in their employment con-
tracts with their former brokerage firm were unenforceable. 6 The employ-
ees signed an agreement stating, in part:
In consideration of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated
("Merrill Lynch") employing me in a sales capacity or for a sales position.
.. it is hereby agreed:
In the event of termination of my services with Merrill Lynch for any rea-
son, I will (i) not solicit, for a period of one year from the date of termination
of my employment, any of the clients of Merrill Lynch whom I served or
other clients of Merrill Lynch whose names became known to me while in
the employ of Merrill Lynch in the office of Merrill Lynch in which I was
employed, and who reside within one hundred miles of the Merrill Lynch
office in which I was employed.57
The stockbrokers planned to argue that the non-solicitation portion of the
employment agreement was unreasonable and/or vague and lacked con-
52 See Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. I951); Johnson v. Stumbo, IZ6 S.W.zd
16S (Ky. 1938).
53 See generally Hall v. Willard & Woolsey, PS.C., 471 S.W. 2d 3 16 (Ky. 1971 ); Martin v. Ratliff
Furniture Co., 264 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Ky. 1954); Mendell v. Golden-Farley of Hopkinsville, Inc.,
573 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
54 Johnson, 126 S.W.zd at 169; see also Vaughan v. Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co., 352 S.W.2d
562 (Ky. 1962) (holding that a restrictive covenant to prevent competition in trade was valid
because it was limited to a city lot for a maximum period often years).
55 Calhoun v. Everman, 242 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Ky. 1951).
56 Wells v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 919 F Supp. 1047, 1048 (E.D.
Ky. 1994).
57 Id. at 1049-50 (emphasis added).
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sideration s8 However, in light of Kentucky case law finding similar con-
tracts valid, 9 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the stockbrokers from
soliciting business from any client of the firm.6' Since a temporary injunc-
tion required the court to assess whether Merrill Lynch demonstrated a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, the decision in Wells may
indicate that the court believed the customer non-solicitation agreement
was valid.61
The court in Wells also took the opportunity to define "solicitation" by
referencing the definition used in conjunction with proxy solicitations un-
der the Securities Act of 1934. The court concluded, "a mere informational
contact between [the employee] and any former client does not constitute
a 'solicitation' under the employment agreements. An informational con-
tact would consist of any written or oral contact that provides information
about the Plaintiffs' whereabouts and how they may be contacted. 6
More recently, in Manhattan Associates, Inc. v. Rider, an employer sued
an ex-employee for soliciting the employer's customers, notwithstanding
the customer non-solicitation and non-compete agreements the employee
entered into while employed. 63 The employer brought claims against the
employee, in part, for breach of contract; breach of loyalty, good faith, and
fiduciary duties; tortious interference with business relationships; and con-
version of client/customer accounts. 6 The United States District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky found the non-compete and non-solicita-
tion clauses unenforceable and dismissed the employer's breach of con-
tract, tortious interference, and conversion of accounts claims. 65 Without
divulging why the agreements were unenforceable, the court noted that
under Kentucky law, unenforceable non-compete and customer non-solici-
tation agreements could not form the basis for a breach of contract claim.6
Moreover, because the agreements were unenforceable and the contacts
58 Id. at 1051.
59 See, e.g., Hall v. Willard & Wollsey, P.S.C., 471 S.W.2d 3 16, 317-18 (Ky. 1971) ("[Clourts
have upheld restrictive covenants where they are reasonable .... Reasonableness is to be
determined generally by the nature of the business or profession and employment, and the
scope of the restrictions with respect to their character, duration and territorial extent ....
Another test of reasonableness may be whether or not the restraint imposed upon the em-
ployee as covenantor is more comprehensive than is necessary to afford fair protection to the
legitimate interests of the employer as convenantee."); Calhoun, 242 S.W.2d at 102.
6o Wells, 919 F Supp. at 1055.
61 Id. at 1o51.
62 Id. at 1053.
63 Manhattan Assocs. v. Rider, No. 3:o2CV-265-S, 2002 WL 1774056 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 1,
2002).
64 Id. at *i.
65 Id. at * 1-2.
66 Id. at *i.
2oo6-2oo7]
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not improper, a claim for tortious interference could not lie against a former
employee who contacted and solicited the employer's customers. 67 Howev-
er, the court did note that to the extent the claims for improper conduct ex-
isted independent from the contract, an order finding the non-solicitation
and non-compete provisions unenforceable did not preclude the claims al-
leging breach of loyalty, good faith, and fiduciary duties.'
In Ceresia v. Mitchell,69 the Kentucky Court of Appeals summarized the
law in Kentucky regarding contracts that restrain trade or competition in
trade. In Ceresia, the Court enjoined the seller of a wholesale fruit market
from competing, in violation of the sales contract, with the purchasers of
the business. In its decision, the Court relied on the Restatement of Con-
tracts, which provides:
Where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade in a bargain has added to it
a promise in unreasonable restraint, the former promise is enforceable un-
less the entire agreement is part of a plan to obtain a monopoly; but if full
performance of a promise indivisible in terms would involve unreasonable
restraint, the promise is illegal and is not enforceable even for so much of
the performance as would be a reasonable restraint.7"
The Court thus held that the provision in the sales contract prohibiting
the seller from selling fruits and vegetables in Muhlenberg County was
enforceable."
The Court also addressed the validity of the restraint on trade and held
that "an agreement imposing a restraint reasonably limited in space is not
against public policy, although unlimited in time of operation, regardless of
the nature of the business or occupation restrained."'" The Court further
noted that if the restriction is necessary for protection of the purchaser, the
agreement will be upheld as reasonable if---on consideration of the subject
matter, the nature of the business, and the situation of the parties-the re-
striction affords fair protection to the interests of the covenantee but is not
so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose undue hardship
on the party restricted. 3
The importance of Ceresia is not that the Court upheld the non-com-
pete provision but rather that in enforcing restrictive covenants ancillary
to employment contracts, Kentucky courts are likely to follow the Restate-
ment, Corbin on Contracts, or other similar sources.
67 Id.
68 Id. at "1-2.
69 Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1951).
70 Id. at 363 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNTRACTs § 518 (1932)).
71 Id.
72 Id. (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 244 (195)).
73 Id. at 364 (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 247 (195 )).
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IV. How OTHER JURISDICTIONS INTERPRET
NON-SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS
While nineteen states regulate restrictive covenants by statute,74 the re-
maining states regulate the covenants by common law. As mentioned,
Kentucky does not have a statute regulating non-solicitation agreements
nor have the courts indicated how they will interpret employee non-solici-
tation agreements. Therefore, an overview of how other jurisdictions have
addressed similar covenants provides guidance for drafting enforceable
non-solicitation agreements.
A. Virginia
Virginia courts favor the interests of the employee when determining the
validity of a restrictive covenant.7" In Virginia, an employer seeking to en-
force a non-solicitation agreement bears the burden of proving that the re-
straint is reasonable.7 6 The reasonableness standard requires that the terms
of the agreement (1) are no greater than necessary to protect the employer
in some legitimate business interest; (2) are not unduly harsh and oppres-
sive in curtailing the employee's legitimate business efforts to earn a liveli-
hood; and (3) are consistent with public policy considerations.77
In Microstrategy, Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., 78 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia analyzed a non-solicitation agree-
ment using the above standard and held that the contested non-solicitation
clause failed each of the three prongs.79 While the court sided with the
74 See ALA. CODE § 8-i-i (2005); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § i66oo (West 2005); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 8-2-113(2) (2005); FLA. STAT. § 542-335 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1 (2005),
invalidated by Jackson & Coker, Inc. v. Hart, 405 S.E.2d 253 (Ga. i99i); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-
4(c)(4) (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.772 (West
2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (2OO5); NEv. REv. STAT. § 613.200 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-4 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 2i7 (2005); OR. REV.
STAT. § 653.295 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-iOI
(2OO6); Tx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 2005); W. VA. CODE § 47-i8-3(a) (2005);
W's. STAT. § 103.465 (2005).
75 See Thomas M. Winn, III & Lindsey H. Dobbs, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Labor
and Employment Law, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 285,314 (2004).
76 See Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666,678 (Va. 2001) (citing Blue Ridge Anesthesia v.
Gidick, 389 S.E.2d 467,469 (Va. ig9o)).
77 See Winn & Dobbs, supra note 75, at 294 (citing Advanced Marine Enters., Inc. v. PRC,
Inc., 501 S.E.2d 148, 155 (Va. 1998)).
78 MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 233 E Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Va. 2002), aff'd, 429
F3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
79 The agreement in question provided, in part, "I agree that, for the period of one
(I) year after termination of my employment with MicroStrategy for any reason, I will not,
directly or indirectly, seek to influence any employees, agents, contractors or customers of
MicroStrategy to terminate or modify their relationship with MicroStrategy." Id. at 794.
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employer as to the reasonableness of the clause's duration, it found that the
restraint was ambiguous and therefore "greater than necessary to protect
the [employer's] legitimate business interests."80 The clause violated the
second prong of the test, as it would "restrict the former employee from
obtaining any type of job in this industry for fear that it might modify that
employer's relationship with MicroStrategy." l Finally, since "[b]oth fed-
eral and state courts in Virginia have held that subjecting the former em-
ployee to such uncertainty offends 'sound public policy,"'"" the provision
also failed the third prong.
While Virginia employers have not fared well in enforcing their non-so-
licitation agreements, the courts' justifications for invalidating the contracts
provides helpful insight on what to avoid and/or include when drafting a
similar non-solicitation agreement.
B. Louisiana
In contrast to Virginia law, Louisiana statutorily prohibits agreements re-
straining persons from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business.,3
However, the holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Martin-Parmy
Corp. v. New Orleans Fire Detection Service effectively put employee non-
solicitation agreements outside of the statutory restrictions for non-com-
petition agreements. 4 The current trend of Louisiana courts is to enforce
restrictive covenants that include a provision that the employee will not
solicit former co-workers after the termination of employment. 5
In National Oil Service of Louisiana, Inc. v. Brown, an employer sought to
enjoin three former employees from scheming to "close down the plaintiff's
business while starting their own, using the same customers, the same key
employees, much of plaintiff's equipment and some of the capital obtained
80 Id. at 795.
8i Id.
82 Id. (quoting Power Distrib. Inc. v. Emergency Power Eng'g, Inc., 569 F Supp. 54, 58
(E.D. Va. 1983)).
83 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:92i (A)(i) (2oo6) ("Every contract or agreement, or provision
thereof, by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business
of any kind, except as provided in this Section, shall be null and void.").
84 Craig A. Courville, Validity of Nonsolicitation Clauses in Employment Contracts, 48 LA.
L. REv. 699, 702 (1988). See Martin-Parry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire Detection Servs., 6o So.
zd 83 (La. 1952) (recognizing that nonsolicitation clauses are different from noncompetitive
clauses in employment contracts).
85 See, e.g., Smith, Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Robinson, 12 F3d 515 (5th Cir. 1994);
Emergency Physicians Ass'n v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., 635 So. 2d 1148 (La.
Ct. App.), vacated, 642 So. 2d 179 (La. 1994); Nat'l Oil Serv. of La., Inc. v. Brown, 381 So. 2d
1269 (La. Ct. App. 198o); John Jay Esthetic Salon, Inc. v. Woods, 377 So. 2d 1363 (La. Ct. App.
1979).
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through the sale of plaintiff's oil." 6 Unfortunately, the employees had not
signed a non-solicitation agreement. The court noted that Louisiana dis-
favors non-competition agreements"7 but pointed out that parties who are
associated in a business may nevertheless agree that upon termination,
they will not hire the employees of the former joint business, and such a
contract is not in violation of the prohibition of restraint on trade statute.s
However, "[i]n the absence of such a contract.., no basis generally exists
for an injunction against the exercise of the basic freedom of association[,J
which is inherent in the hiring of employees and the taking of a job with
an employer."89
While Louisiana courts deem non-competition agreements contrary to
public policy, they are reluctant to invalidate a non-solicitation agreement
based on public policy. In Emergency Physicians Association v. Our Lady of the
Lake Regional Medical Center, the disputed provision was an agreement by
one hospital that it would not solicit the partners of the Emergency Physi-
cians Association, a partnership formed to render emergency room medical
services, during the terms of the contract.9 Upholding the agreement, the
Louisiana Court of Appeals held that because the hospital remained free
to negotiate and contract with any other physician or group of physicians, a
contract prohibiting the hospital from soliciting individual partners to per-
form emergency services did not violate public policy or interfere with the
hospital's duty to provide high quality emergency room services.91
While Louisiana has a statute that regulates restraints on trade, the stat-
ute does not directly address the issue of employee non-solicitation agree-
ments.9 Nevertheless, the courts are willing to uphold employee non-so-
licitation agreements that meet the other basic requirements of the statute.
If, however, an employer does not incorporate a non-solicitation agreement
in the employment contract, the Louisiana courts are not willing to imply
the provision.
86 Nat'l Oil Serv. of La., Inc., 381 So. 2d at 1274.
87 Id. at 1272.
88 Id. at 1274; see§ 23:921.
89 Nat' Oil Serv. of La., Inc., 381 So. 2d at 1274-75.
90 Emergency Physicians Ass'n, 635 So. ad at 1148.
91 Id. at 1150.
92 § 23:921(C) ("Any person ... who is employed as an agent, servant, or employee may
agree with his employer to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that
of the employer and/or from soliciting customers of the employer within a specified parish or
parishes, municipality or municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer carries on a
like business therein, not to exceed a period of two years from termination of employment.
...").
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C. California
The state of California has a statute that generally prohibits non-competi-
tion agreements between an employer and its employees. 93 The applicable
code section, however, does not invalidate a non-solicitation clause in an
employment agreement. 4 As a result, in some circumstances a California
employer may "contractually prohibit former employees from raiding its
workforce for a limited period following termination of employment."95
The leading case in California validating a non-solicitation agreement
is Loral Corp. v. Moyes.96 In Moyes, California's Sixth District Court of Ap-
peals upheld a contract that prohibited terminated employees from so-
liciting other employees to join a new business (called "noninterference
covenants" in California).97 Most importantly, the decision stands for the
proposition that clauses in employment agreements are valid under the
common law of restraints of trade since they are reasonable measures for
ensuring the stability of an employer's workforce. 98 The court noted that
although the limitation may somewhat restrict the former employee's busi-
ness practices, the agreement was enforceable because it had no overall
negative impact on trade or business, and it did not constitute a covenant
not to compete. 99 Furthermore, the fact that the covenant continued in-
definitely was not controlling. Rather, "enforceability depends upon its
reasonableness, evaluated in terms of the employer, the employee, and the
public. ' ' 100
While California's statute voiding agreements that restrain one from
engaging in a lawful business favors employees, it is interesting to recog-
nize that the California courts treat non-solicitation agreements somewhat
differently. The noninterference covenants are not considered direct re-
straints on trade. Therefore courts will not subject them to the strict stan-
dards applied to non-compete agreements.
93 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2005) ("Except as provided in this chapter,
every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or
business of any kind is to that extent void."); see also Christina L. Wu, Non-compete Agreements
in California: Should California Courts Uphold Choice of Law Provisions Specifying Another State's
Law?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 593 (2003).
94 See Maxxim Med., Inc. v. Michelson, 51 F. Supp. 2d 773, 782 (S.D. Tex.) (applying
California law), re'd, 18z E3d 915 (5th Cir. I999).
95 Robinson v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Int'l Ltd., 856 E Supp. 554, 558 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
96 Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Ct. App. 1985). Specifically, the former em-
ployee's employment contract provided that, after termination, he "[would] not now or in the
future disrupt, damage, impair or interfere with [former employer's business] ... whether by
way of interfering with or raiding its employees ... or otherwise." Id. at 840.
97 Id.
98 2 ALTMAN, supra note 29.
99 Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
ioo Id.
[Vol. 95
NON-SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS
D. Ohio
Since Ohio does not statutorily regulate the validity of restrictive covenants
in employment contracts, Ohio courts rely upon the "reasonableness" test
set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in Raimonde v. VanVlerah.0 1 In Rai-
monde, the court held the following:
[A] covenant not to compete which imposes unreasonable restrictions
upon an employee will be enforced to the extent necessary to protect the
employer's legitimate interests. A covenant restraining an employee from
competing with his former employer upon termination of employment is
reasonable if it is no greater than is required for the protection of the em-
ployer, does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and is not injuri-
ous to the public. Courts are empowered to modify or amend employment
agreements to achieve such results. °O
Various factors are considered in determining the validity of the agreement
in restraint on trade, including the agreement's geographic and time limi-
tations.103 The leading case in Ohio applying the Raimonde test to a non-
compete and non-solicitation agreement is UZ Engineered Products Co. v.
Midwest Motor Supply Co.'°4 In UZ Engineered Products, not only did the Ohio
Court of Appeals enforce the employee's agreement, 0 but as a result of the
new employer's tortious interference with the employment agreement, the
court awarded punitive damages to the former employer." In response to
the employee's claim that the non-solicitation agreement was invalid, the
court held that the first element of Raimonde-protection of a legitimate
interest of the employer-clearly weighed in favor of the enforcement of
the employer's restrictive covenants.0 7 As to the second element-that the
non-compete clause must not impose undue hardship on the employee-
the court found there was a lack of evidence proving that enforcement of
the two-year territorial restriction would cause the former employees to
ioi Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio 1975).
102 Id. at 544-47.
io3 UZ Engineered Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1o68,
1076 (Ohio Ct. App. zooi).
io4 Id. at 1o68.
io5 Specifically, in the non-solicitation clauses, the employee agreed that for the two-year
period after the employee left plaintiff's employment, he or she would not solicit plaintiff's
other employees to leave their employment with plaintiff. Id. at 1074.
io6 Id. at 1o83. The court followed the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 766 elements
of the tort of intentional interference with contract which are "(i) the existence of a contract,
(2) the wrongdoer's knowledge of the contract, (3) the wrongdoer's intentional procurement of
the contract's breach, (4) lack of justification, and (5) resulting damages." Id.
107 Id. at io8o.
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suffer undue hardship. 08 Finally, the court held that the employer met the
third element-the public's interest in promoting fair business competi-
tion-because the particular industry involved was highly competitive and
enforcement of the covenant would not adversely affect business competi-
tion in the industry or harm the public.1 9
While the Raimonde analysis provides that a court may reform an unen-
forceable non-solicitation agreement to protect an employer's legitimate
business interest in maintaining stability, the Ohio Court of Appeals, in
Busch v. Premier Integrated Medical Associates., Ltd., 0 affirmed the lower
court's decision to invalidate a non-solicitation agreement and upheld the
lower court's decision refusing to modify the covenant."' After invalidat-
ing the non-solicitation agreement between PriMed-a medical practice
group-and two cardiologists, the trial court declined to amend the agree-
ment, finding that PriMed had other means to protect its interests."' The
other means included a 180-day waiting period for resignation of employ-
ees and/or non-competition agreements." 3 The Busch decision is important
because the court refused to amend the agreement even though it recog-
nized that (1) PriMed had an interest in maintaining a stable workforce,
(2) six of the seven employees the cardiologists hired were former PriMed
employees, and (3) per Raimonde, the court had the discretion to amend the
terms of the non-solicitation covenant to render its restrictions reasonable.
E. Florida
Florida has a comprehensive statute setting forth what constitutes valid
restraints on trade or commerce." 4 The validity of non-solicitation agree-
ments (called "nonpiracy agreements" in Florida) is controlled by this stat-
io8 Id. at io8x.
io9 Id. The industry involved was the "maintenance, repair, and operation (MRO) in-
dustry who sell products ... to businesses, institutions, and agencies that perform mainte-
nance for buildings, machinery, equipment, and vehicles." Id. at 1073.
iio Busch v. Premier Integrated Med. Assocs., Ltd., No. 19364,2003 WL 22o6o392 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2003).
i ii The nonsolicitation agreement stated, "During the term of this Agreement and for
one (i) year thereafter, the Physician shall not, directly or indirectly, hire[,] solicit, encourage
to leave the employment of, or engage to cease to work the Employer, any employee of the
Employer, or any independent contractor with the Employer, or hire any employee who has
left the employment of the Employer." Id. at *6.
112 Id.
113 Id. The court also made several other recommendations aside from a non-solicitation
agreement that would protect PriMed's interest in maintaining stability. One recommenda-
tion included entering into written contracts with the employees providing for a specified
term of employment. Id. "Even when several are hired on the same day, the terms could be
of varying lengths of time. Further, the employee would then have an opportunity to decide
whether his or her own opportunities should be subject to such a restriction." Id. at *7.
1 14 FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2005).
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ute. Applying these statutory requirements, the District Court of Appeal
of Florida, in Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., upheld a nonpiracy agree-
ment that prohibited a sales manager from soliciting or influencing other
employees to leave the car dealership for two years following the manager's
resignation."' In upholding the agreement and enforcing a temporary in-
junction, the court found that the agreement was necessary to protect the
dealership's investment in specialized sales training, supported by consid-
eration of continued employment, and contained a reasonable restraint of
only two years. 16
Thus, based on statutory requirements, courts in Florida will uphold a
non-solicitation agreement that protects a legitimate business interest; is
not overbroad; is reasonably related to the employer's line of business; is
reasonable in duration (agreement presumed unreasonable if greater than
two years); and is supported by adequate consideration.
V. GUIDE TO DRAFTING ENFORCEABLE
NON-SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS IN KENTUCKY
A. General Drafting Considerations
Due to the large amount of uncertainties in judicial enforcement of non-
solicitation agreements and the uncertainties of judicial reformation of con-
tracts with unreasonable restrictions on competition, an employer should
recognize the importance of careful drafting to ensure that such contracts
will be enforceable as written." 7 Since enforceability of a non-solicitation
agreement is a highly fact-specific determination, an employer cannot de-
finitively know whether its non-solicitation agreement will be upheld in
court. Thus, it is important for employers to adequately prepare before a
dispute arises to increase the probability that their non-solicitation agree-
ment will be enforceable. As explained in several of the above-mentioned
jurisdictions, to be enforceable a non-solicitation covenant should be: in
writing; signed by the employee; ancillary to employment; supported by
consideration; reasonable; and consistent with the public interest."8 S i m -
pie contract drafting techniques may also help improve the enforceability
of a non-solicitation agreement. First, the employer should note the basic
tenets of contract construction. Courts generally construe contracts against
the drafter; therefore, constructing a clear and unambiguous non-solicita-
tion agreement is essential." 9 Second, the employer should specify that the
115 Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So. ad 858 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
116 Id. at 859.
117 See generally Tinio, supra note 19.
i18 Seesupra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
i 19 William G. Porter, II & Michael C. Griffaton, Using Noncompete Agreements to Protect
Legitimate Business Interests, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 194, 199 (2OO2); cf FLA. STAT. § 5 4 2. 3 3 5 (h) (2006)
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non-solicitation agreement is an express condition of employment,2 0 thus
avoiding challenges to the validity of the agreement if the employee does
not sign it until after beginning employment.' Third, the employer should
make the agreement assignable and allow enforceability by successors and
assigns.' 2 The agreement should state that its terms survive termination of
the employment relationship whether the relationship is terminated with
or without cause.'23 Finally, employers should weigh the possible risks and
benefits of unnecessarily aggressive restrictions.2 4 It is advisable to include
only those restrictions that are truly necessary to protect the employer.2 ,
For example, if an employer is concerned that an employee will quit and
attempt to take other employees, "the employer should consider using a
narrow non-solicitation agreement, rather than a broad non-competition
agreement, to increase the chances the agreement will be enforced to pro-
tect the employer's legitimate business interests."
2 6
Along these same lines, "rather than using one agreement for all em-
ployees, employers should customize agreements for each type of employ-
ee."'2 7 "Customizing the relevant restrictions for each type of employee
helps achieve the appropriate balance of maximizing the protections pro-
vided to the employer while keeping the burden on the employee reason-
able so that a court will be likely to enforce the agreement."'18 Broad boil-
erplate language applied in every employee's non-solicitation agreement
is not the most effective way to draft a reasonable non-solicitation agree-
ment." 9 Specifically tailoring a non-solicitation agreement to the particular
circumstances of the employee and job involved is the best way to protect
the employer's interests. While a client may perceive a non-solicitation as a
cookie-cutter form that can be used without modification for any employ-
ee, lawyers should be careful to explain to their clients the risks of using a
previously drafted non-solicitation agreement for a new employee without
the consideration of counsel. 30
(providing a notable exemption to this maxim with respect to non-compete agreements, by
which courts are expressly prohibited from "constru[ing] a restrictive covenant narrowly,
against the restraint, or against the drafter").
i2o Porter & Griffaton, supra note i i9.
121 Id. at 2oo.
122 Anita Larson, Non-Solicitation, Non-Disclosure, and Confidentialily Agreements, ROUGH
NOTES MAG., July 3, 2003, http://www.roughnotes.comlrnmagazine/2oo3/julyo3/o7pIo2.htm.
123 Id.
124 Funkhouser, supra note 7.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Hone, supra note 36.
130 Patrick D. Robben, No Cookie Cutters, Please: How to Draft Effective Noncompete
Agreements, Bus. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 36.
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B. Useful Guidance from Other Jurisdictions
It is important to recognize that state law governs the enforcement of non-
solicitation agreements. A non-solicitation agreement that is reasonable
and enforceable in one state will not necessarily be enforceable in another
state."' Since there is no case law in Kentucky that evaluates employee
non-solicitation agreements, it is important to analyze how and why other
jurisdictions enforce these agreements. The variations in the ways other
courts enforce non-solicitation agreements require the drafter to discern
common factors among the courts and then combine these factors with
available Kentucky law. While it is evident from prior case law that Ken-
tucky courts will analyze non-solicitation agreements under the general
rubric of restrictive covenants (since Kentucky does not govern restrictive
covenants by statute), it would be more advantageous to analyze jurisdic-
tions without statutes, jurisdictions with broad statutes regulating restraints
on trade, and the judicial interpretations of these statutes.
In Virginia, a state with no statute regulating restrictive covenants, the
concern for the well-being of employees and their ability to earn a living
seems to drive the Virginia Supreme Court's decision to invalidate non-
solicitation agreements.' 3 The courts will uphold the agreement only if
narrowly construed. 3  On the other hand, courts in Ohio, another state with
no statute regulating restrictive covenants, do a better job of balancing the
competing interests of the employer and the employee. While Ohio courts
also require narrow construction of the agreement and that it be no more
restrictive than necessary to protect the employer's interests, the courts
also weigh the undue hardship on the employee and the public's interest
in fair competition. 3" This approach seems to align better with Kentucky
courts' approach to restrictive covenants. It may also be helpful to look at
the factors that motivate Louisiana courts, a state that statutorily prohib-
its agreements restraining trade. 3 The Louisiana courts note that while
public policy generally prohibits non-competition agreements, they will
not apply public policy arguments to non-solicitation agreements if those
agreements do not interfere with the employee's exercise of an important
legal privilege or responsibility. 136 Ultimately, what seems to be driving the
Louisiana courts' decision is freedom of contract and freedom of associa-
tion. As long as the non-solicitation agreement does not unduly restrain
competition or violate the applicable statute, then courts will uphold these
agreements.
131 See supra notes 74-116 and accompanying text; see also Tinio, supra note 19.
132 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
133 See Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (Va. 2001).
134 Seesupra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
135 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A)(i) (2005).
136 See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
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Aside from the generalities gathered from the case law in these states, it
is also helpful to analyze some specific attributes of the contracts that could
aid in drafting enforceable non-solicitation agreements.
C. Reasonableness
Courts will enforce contracts restraining freedom of employment when the
agreements are reasonable.'37 As mentioned, an employer seeking to enforce
a non-solicitation agreement bears the burden of proving that the restraint
is reasonable. Most courts agree that reasonableness requires that the terms
of the agreement: (1) are necessary to protect the employer's legitimate
business interest; (2) do not impose an undue hardship on the employee;
and (3) do not violate public policy 38 However, employers should note that
some states are quick to find a non-solicitation agreement invalid because
it is ambiguous, offends public policy, or because less restrictive means are
available to protect the employer's interests. 39 Furthermore, most states
will not enforce a non-solicitation agreement unless it is reasonable in both
duration and geographic scope. In making this determination, courts will
consider both what is necessary to protect the employer's interests and the
burden the agreement imposes on the employee. 1"4 "These determinations
are fact specific and depend on factors such- as the nature of the employer,
the employer's industry[,] and the skill level and job description of the em-
ployee."1 4 Typically, an employee non-solicitation agreement is enforce-
able if it prohibits an ex-employee from soliciting current employees for
two years or less after termination of employment. 141 "Geographic restric-
tions typically prevent activities within a specified geographic area" (e.g.,
within a 100-mile radius of a city, or within a fifty-mile radius of any of the
employer's offices).'43 Geographic restrictions appear less often in non-so-
licitation clauses because non-solicitation clauses focus on customers and
employees whereas non-compete provisions are more concerned with geo-
graphic restrictions.' 44 As such, employee non-solicitation clauses usually
contain implied geographic limitations.' 4s Kentucky employers should note
137 Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein, 25 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Ky. 1930).
138 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 8o-82 and accompanying text.
14o Funkhouser, supra note 7.
141 Id.
142 See supra note io8.
143 Rees, supra note 6. While a three-year restriction is presumptively unreasonable in
Florida, both Florida and Ohio courts have held that a two-year restriction is reasonable.
144 Id.
145 Id. (citing Bell Fuel Corp. v. Cattolico, %44 A.2d 450,458 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (hold-
ing that despite having no express temporal or geographic limitations, a reasonable construc-
tion of the covenant revealed an implied geographic limitation)).
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that in Calhoun v. Everman, 46 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that
restrictive covenants are enforceable where they are unlimited as to time
yet confined to a reasonable territory.'47 This is not to say, however, that
Kentucky courts will approve an employee non-solicitation agreement that
continues indefinitely.
D. Consideration
An agreement not to solicit is enforceable only if the employer gives the
employee consideration in exchange for signing the agreement.148 Typically,
if the employee signs an agreement at the start of employment, sufficient
consideration exists. If, however, an at-will employee signs the agreement
after he or she has already begun working for the employer, continued em-
ployment alone is not sufficient consideration-the employer must pro-
vide some additional benefit to the employee.149 If the employer wants an
existing employee to sign such an agreement, the employer should offer
the existing employee a promotion, raise, bonus or some other benefit that
would not otherwise be due to the employee in exchange for signing the
agreement.5 0 A written contract given to a previously at-will employee al-
lowing termination only for cause also suffices as adequate consideration.''
However, threat of loss of employment upon refusal to sign a restriction
usually does not constitute sufficient consideration to support non-solicita-
tion covenants. 1
52
In addition to an offer of employment or some other benefit after em-
ployment has begun, the employer should "have the employee acknowl-
edge that the consideration given is adequate and sufficient." 15 3 Such an
acknowledgement makes it more difficult for an employee later to assert
the defense that the consideration given in exchange for the employee's
promises was inadequate. 154
146 Calhoun v. Everman, 242 S.W.2d ioo (Ky. 195I).
147 Id. at 102.
148 Funkhouser, supra note 7.
149 Robben, supra note 13o; see also Nat'l Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 E Supp.
417, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that mere continuation of employment was not sufficient
consideration for a non-compete agreement despite the fact that the employment relationship
was terminable at will of either party).
150 See Rees, supra note 6 ("Among the items that courts have upheld as sufficient con-
sideration are agreements to pay increased compensation, profit sharing benefits, increased
severance benefits, and stock options.").
151 Porter & Griffaton, supra note 19, at 195; see also Robben, supra note 130.
152 In r, Verdi, 244 B.R. 314 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000).
153 Larson, supra note 122.
154 Id.
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E. Judicial Modification
In some jurisdictions, an overbroad or unreasonable non-solicitation agree-
ment provision will render the entire agreement unenforceable."S' In order to
provide reasonable protection to a company's legitimate business interests,
courts in other jurisdictions, such as Ohio, are empowered to re-draft over-
broad agreements. 15 6 "In doing so, the court will examine the same factors
involved in determining whether the restriction is reasonable as written."'
57
Another way to enhance enforcement of the employment agreement is
by including a "blue pencil" clause.'58 Blue pencil clauses allow the court
to modify an unreasonably restrictive or indefinite covenant, instead of in-
validating the entire agreement.'59 "For example, if a court found that a
two-year non-competition agreement was unreasonable, it might choose to
enforce the agreement for only a one-year term, if the court believed that
this would be reasonable, rather than not enforcing it at all."'" "An astute
employer will include a judicial modification clause in the non-solicitation
agreement since a court will be more likely to blue-pencil an overly broad
covenant if the employee has agreed to it in advance."'161 In addition to
a "blue-pencil" clause, it may also be beneficial to include a severability
clause in the non-solicitation agreement. 6 This clause would permit a
court to modify an unenforceable agreement.' 63 Counsel, however, should
be careful not to draft a non-solicitation agreement in the broadest possible
terms and then rely on a court's ability or willingness to redraft the agree-
ment. 64 Redrafting is not required by the courts, and courts may simply
155 Porter & Griffaton, supra note I 19, at 198; see also Wis. STAT. § 103.465 (2OO5) ("Any
covenant.,, imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as to
any part of the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable restraint.").
156 Porter & Griffaton, supra note 119, at 198; see also Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325
N.E.zd 544,547 (Ohio 1975).
157 Porter & Griffaton, supra note i 19, at 198; see also Shipley Co. v. Clark, 728 F. Supp.
818, 826-27 (D. Mass. 199o) (interpreting MICH. COMP. LAws § 445.774a (West 2005));
Raimonde, 325 N.E.zd at 547 (court abandons "blue pencil" test in favor of reasonableness
and determines what restrictions would be reasonable between the parties).
158 Gerry Husch, The Truth About Non-competes in Idaho, IDAHO EMP. L. LET'ER, Dec.
2003, Westlaw 8 No. 9 SMIDEMPLLi.
159 Id.
16o Funkhouser, supra note 7.
161 Husch, supra note I58.
162 Porter& Griffaton, supra note s 19, at 198; see also Davey Tree Expert Co. v.Ackelbein,
25 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1930) (restriction on employment, where capable of being cut down to
eliminate unreasonable part, will be enforced as to parts considered reasonable as may be
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refuse to enforce the agreement if any provision is overbroad or unreason-
able. 6"
VI. CONCLUSION
When an employee leaves, an employer not only loses the time and money
spent training and developing the employee, but it is also faced with the
possibility that the employee will join a competing organization and solicit
former co-workers to join him or her. The competitor may offer a more
lucrative employment package, or the employee could simply be unhappy
with his current work environment. Whatever the reason, it is essential
that employers protect their own interests and require key employees to
sign an employee non-solicitation agreement. It is difficult to tell exactly
how and when the courts in Kentucky will uphold these agreements, but
by following these general guidelines and the principles derived from the
comparative analysis of other jurisdictions, practitioners can enhance the
likelihood of judicial enforcement. In addition, because much of the value
of these agreements lies in their ability to deter employees from engaging
in employee pirating in the first place, simply having the employees sign
the contracts may be enough to protect the employer's interest.
165 ld.; see also Profrl Investigations & Consulting Agency, Inc. v. Kingsland, 591 N.E.2d
1265, 1270 (Ohio Ct. App. 199o).
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